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System analysis is an essential technical discipline for the modern design of spacecraft 
and their associated missions.  Specifically, system analysis is a powerful aid in identifying 
and prioritizing the required technologies needed for mission and/or vehicle development 
efforts.  Maturation of intelligent systems technologies, and their incorporation into 
spacecraft systems, are dictating the development of new analysis tools, and incorporation of 
such tools into existing system analysis methodologies, in order to fully capture the trade-offs 
of autonomy on vehicle and mission success.  A “system analysis of autonomy” methodology 
will be outlined and applied to a set of notional human-rated lunar/Mars lander missions 
toward answering these questions: 1. what is the optimum level of vehicle autonomy and 
intelligence required? and 2. what are the specific attributes of an autonomous system 
implementation essential for a given surface lander mission/application in order to maximize 
mission success?  Future human-rated lunar/Mars landers, though nominally under the 
control of their crew, will, nonetheless, be highly automated systems.   These automated 
systems will range from mission/flight control functions, to vehicle health monitoring and 
prognostication, to life-support and other “housekeeping” functions.  The optimum degree of 
autonomy afforded to these spacecraft systems/functions has profound implications from an 
exploration system architecture standpoint.    
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Nomenclature 
 
ax Coefficients, defined in text 
CAS Autonomous System Complexity 
CEO Environmental and Operational Complexity 
DI “Degree of inaccessibility” 
DIN “Degree of interaction” among spacecraft and 
other intelligent systems to complete a given 
mission 
DR “Degree of resistance” 
FP Processor speed (instruction or operation) 
LOA Level of Autonomy 
mx Coefficients, defined in text 
mc Mass of lander “cargo,” kg 
mp Mass of lander mission payload, including crew 
if any, kg 
MROI Mission return on investment 
Ncrew Number of crew onboard spacecraft 
NB Number of robotic behaviors 
NC Number of control actuators 
NDOF Number of degrees of freedom, robot mobility 
NL Lines of software code 
NM Size of system dynamic memory 
NP Number of processors 
NR Number of “robots” (and/or intelligent systems, 
including automated spacecraft systems) 
NRule Number of conditional (heuristic) rules 
NS Number of sensors 
NV Number of state space variables 
Q QFD-inspired technology-to-goals matrix 
RC Control input rate 
S Mission success 
T Mission duration 
 
 Parameter embodying value of lander “cargo” 
(1 low value to 10 high value) 
v Total mission “delta-v,” km/s 
 Vehicle intelligence metric  
 Vehicle autonomous system implementation 
elegance metric 
  Parameter embodying ease of distribution/usage 
of cargo (1 easy to 10 difficult) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070018201 2019-08-30T00:57:44+00:00Z
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 Spacecraft system Level of Autonomy (LOA), 
010, “aleph” 
 
Superscript: 
* “Normalized” metrics of vehicle intelligence, 
elegance, and degrees of inaccessibility, 
resistance, and interaction, such that range of 
value of parameters fall within 0 and 10  
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
KEY to NASA’s plans for a return to the Moon, and beyond, will be the development of new spacecraft and 
associated systems.  This includes a new generation of human-rated lunar landers and future lander concepts for 
human exploration of Mars.  As is widely known, NASA is currently in the midst of defining and implementing its 
exploration system architecture, as detailed, in part, in Ref. 1.  The development of new human-rated lunar landers is 
key feature of this architecture; these landers are referred to Ref. 1 as lunar surface access modules (LSAM).   
Though the general details of the exploration system architecture are fairly advanced in maturity, it still remains to 
be determined as to the complement of autonomous system technologies that will ultimately be incorporated in this 
new generation of spacecraft.    
 
System analysis is an essential technical discipline for the modern design of spacecraft and their associated 
missions.  Specifically, system analysis is a powerful aid in identifying and prioritizing the required technologies 
needed for mission and/or vehicle development efforts.  Maturation of autonomous systems, or a.k.a. intelligent 
systems, technologies, and their incorporation into spacecraft, will dictate the development of new analysis tools, 
and incorporation of such tools into existing system analysis methodologies, in order to fully capture the tradeoffs of 
autonomy on spacecraft and mission success.  A first-order “system analysis of autonomy” methodology that is 
tailored for the analysis of crewed spacecraft will be outlined in this paper.  This analysis methodology will then be 
applied to a set of notional human-rated lunar and/or Mars surface lander missions.   
 
Fig. 1.  Apollo 11 Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) “Eagle” in the lunar orbit (NASA Image # GPN 2000-001210) 
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Why not just dust off the old Apollo lunar excursion module (LEM) flight control and avionics drawings and 
modestly update to current technology (see Fig. 1 and, for example, Ref. 2)?  Primarily because, as mission duration 
increases and explorations go further outward from Earth, planetary surface landers will look less and less like 
Apollo-type landers and more like one part habitat and one part operations center.  Correspondingly, the design and 
development of future generations of human-rated landers will be as much about the complement and capabilities of 
the surface operation and scientific equipment carried by the lander as it will be about the lander itself.    
 
For human-rated lunar/planetary surface landers, high levels of vehicle autonomy could be a powerful enabling 
force as to mission capability.   Other than the most qualitative of assessments, how can cost/benefit analysis for 
incorporation of autonomous system technologies into crewed spacecraft be performed?   The first step needs to be 
the definition of metrics for autonomy that are unambiguous and quantifiable.  Fundamental concepts such as 
autonomy, intelligence, and elegance for planetary aerial vehicles (a.k.a. aerial explorers) and high altitude long 
endurance (HALE) uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV) was initially presented in Refs. 3-4. Metrics associated with 
these properties for autonomous aerial vehicles were employed to develop a system analysis framework for 
assessing technology portfolios for such platforms.  This system analysis work was further expanded upon in Refs. 
5-6.   It will be demonstrated in this paper that the technology portfolio and associated system analysis 
methodologies detailed in Refs. 3-6 can be extended to crewed and robotic spacecraft and associated systems.  In 
particular, this paper will investigate the autonomous system technology portfolio issues related to human-rated 
surface landers.   Because of its more expansive nature, as compared to the metrics/scales used in Ref. 4 and Ref. 6, 
the level of autonomy metric scale defined in Ref. 3 will be used in this paper.  These metrics will support the 
analysis of automation and autonomous system technology investments to support development and use of human-
rated lunar and planetary surface landers.  This paper is a work in progress, but hopefully presents initial results of 
general interest.   
 
Once having defined quantifiable autonomy metrics for spacecraft, reasonable first-order functional relationships 
are defined relating vehicle and mission characteristics to aforesaid autonomy metrics, and ultimately related to 
individual autonomous system technologies.  By way of illustration, Fig. 2a-b shows notional drawings of two 
different types of surface landers potentially used for said notional missions.  Figure 2a is a notional drawing of a 
crewed lunar lander; Fig. 2b is illustrates a “pallet”-version of an automated cargo lander.   The two notional surface 
landers also represent a spectrum of mission capabilities, vehicle design, and technology challenges.   
 
(a)  (b) 
Fig. 2.  (a) Notional Crewed Surface Lander and (b) Automated Cargo Lander Variant 
 
 
It is also important to note that the greatest impact of autonomous system technology is not limited to its 
implementation on a single spacecraft platform/system, or even multiple variants of a single vehicle type, but rather 
the greatest impact will result from the application of autonomy to heterogeneous spacecraft systems working in 
cooperation/collaboration with each other to achieve mission success.   Figures 3a and 3b show two examples of 
cooperating autonomous space systems: (1) autonomous “test driving” of exploration equipment and (2) 
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establishment of long-term (unattended) robotic outposts that provide a capacity for “virtual presence” by Earth-side 
researchers and perhaps even the general public.   
 
(a) 
 
(b) (c) 
Fig. 3a-b.  Examples of Collaborative Operations: (a) Test Drive of Exploration Equipment and (b) Long-
Term Robotic Outposts and (c) Virtual Presence 
 
 
II. Future Missions and Required Spacecraft Autonomy and Intelligence 
 
A. Autonomy 
 
Numerous researchers have attempted to define autonomy in terms of a Level of Autonomy (LOA) metric and 
scale.  Most such work has focused on either terrestrial vehicles and systems – see, for example, Refs. 4, 7, 8, and 9 
–  or, alternatively, on purely robotic spacecraft or systems, e.g. Ref. 3.  A few attempts have been made to consider 
autonomy and autonomous system technologies in the context of human-rated spacecraft, notably Refs. 10-12.   In 
most cases the proposed LOA metric/scale becomes quite complicated and oftentimes fails to deal with the type of 
issues that need to be addressed by vehicle or mission system analyses.  Table 1 defines the LOA used in this paper; 
it is based, in large part, on the work of Ref. 3.  As will, hopefully, be seen at the conclusion of this paper, this level 
of autonomy scale provides the proper balance between simplicity and flexibility to address the types of vehicle and 
mission design issues studied in spacecraft system analysis.   Further, this space-system oriented LOA can be 
mapped to a simpler, comparable LOA developed for terrestrial high-altitude and long endurance (HALE) 
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV), Ref. 4.   The level of autonomy scale summarized in Table 1 is quite expansive 
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in nature.  It defines autonomous system characteristics from fairly simple devices/systems that are manifested in 
multitude current spacecraft systems to highly speculative capabilities that perhaps are decades away from being 
realized.    
 
 
 
Table 1.  Proposed Spacecraft and Planetary Surface Operation Systems Autonomy Levels 
 
 
Level 
# 
Level Description Capability 
10 Legacy/Legate Human-surrogate capability to conduct long-term (perhaps years or decades) high-level exploration and 
scientific investigation.   
9 Human Explorer 
Assistant 
Limited human-level surrogate capability that works in close conjunction with human explorers and 
oftentimes acts as a liaison or intermediary for humans with other robotic systems 
8 Integrated, Optimal 
Autonomy & Design 
Autonomy considerations are implemented intrinsically in spacecraft design and mission simulation.  
Additionally, for vehicles with “morphing,” hybrid, or adaptive capability, autonomous system 
characteristics are modified in accordance with revised vehicle characteristics (i.e. a simultaneous 
autonomous system and physical transmogrification).   
7 Robotic Ecosystem –
Participant 
Systems are part of a large and robust robotic ecosystem.  All robotic systems part of this ecosystem 
must collaborate, and sometimes compete, for resources and other (oftentimes provided by human 
explorer) rewards.  Such an ecosystem is only likely during and in support of human exploration 
campaigns.   Missions being supported by such robotic ecosystems tend to be open-ended in terms of 
scope and duration.   
6 Robotic Symbiosis – 
Leader/Co-Equal 
Automation for extended missions (i.e. multiple sorties with multiple automated cycles of 
servicing/recharging/refueling) is applied across multiple heterogeneous robotic systems, where the 
spacecraft, or planetary surface operation systems, take on leadership and or co-equal roles with other 
systems (necessitating robust “negotiation” for information and energy resources).   
5 Robotic Symbiosis – 
Subordinate or 
Dependent 
Automation for the mission is applied across multiple heterogeneous robotic systems, in addition to the 
spacecraft, for the whole of the mission.  Spacecraft, or planetary surface operation system, is primarily 
subordinate to some other robotic system, which provides guidance and support. 
4 Opportunistic Self-
Modifiable Goals and 
Lines of Investigation 
Mission goals/objectives and approaches can be completely (autonomously) redefined as a consequence 
of information garnished during the course of the mission (i.e. things discovered and hypotheses 
disproved or revised).  Sophisticated, intelligent sensors are employed on the spacecraft or robotic 
system.§   
3 Search, Inquiry, and 
Decisions through 
“Discovery” 
Spacecraft, or robotic planetary surface operations system, implements behaviors, rather than 
flight/mission scripts.  Heuristic and/or stochastic search and find methodology employed to find key 
science-driven features of interest.†  Adaptive fault/anomaly logic implemented.   
2 Changeable (though still 
scripted) Mission  
Ability to enable scripted contingency plans based upon pre-defined (well-posed) conditional logic 
conditions.* 
1 Execute Pre-Planned 
Missions 
Can execute a scripted mission plan without human intervention; only limited contingency/fault 
capability.*   
 
 
Notes:   
 
*Navigation limited to simple sensors and Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs). 
†Navigation based on sophisticated (non-GPS) sensors, including sun- or star-trackers, LIDAR, RADAR, etc. 
§Navigation suite must include vision-based systems.   
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Fig. 4.  Mapping of Ref. 1 UAV LOA against Spacecraft & Robotic Explorer Autonomy Metrics 
 
There is a general presumption that spacecraft autonomous system technologies will be essential to perform 
routine functions – e.g. automated cargo landers developed to support supply chain logistics for future lunar and 
planetary surface explorations.  Further, though, it will be argued, and supportive analysis provided, that even 
crewed surface landers will require high-levels of system autonomy (autonomy in the context of being performed by 
machine and not human, whether on the ground or onboard the spacecraft) in order to achieve acceptable levels of 
mission success while minimizing cost and risk.  It is still arguable for relatively short duration, and lower Earth 
orbit (LEO) or cis-lunar, missions whether building in high-levels of autonomy and vehicle intelligence is cost 
effective with acceptable risk for crewed spacecraft – refer, for example, to Ref. 12.  But, on the other hand, as 
missions become longer in duration, as semi-permanent bases/encampments are established, and as mankind travels 
deeper into space, then autonomy (and the associated concept of intelligence) will surely be necessary for both 
crewed and crewless spacecraft and surface operation systems.   Though it is far from a settled issue it would seem, 
though, that the new exploration architecture would incorporate a fairly sophisticated level of vehicle autonomy into 
the next generation of crewed spacecraft.    
 
B. Various Notional Lander Missions and Overall Characteristics 
 
In order to fully appreciate the challenges of defining the scope of the system analysis problem it is first 
necessary to distinguish between exploration activities in support of infrastructure development, expeditionary 
campaigns, missions, and investigations.   Arguably investigations and, to a lesser degree, missions can be 
considered to be science-driven because we are exploring the unknown.  On the other hand, infrastructure 
development, expeditionary campaigns, and some missions are exploration-driven.   
 
 
 
Fig. 5.   A Notional Hierarchy of Exploration Activity 
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Examples of expeditionary campaigns and missions involving surface landers are shown in Table 2.   These 
representative missions will be referred to in later sections of the paper – particularly in the context of benchmarking 
spacecraft autonomy metrics and establishing functional relationships for the proposed “system analysis for 
autonomy” methodology.   
 
 
Table 2.  Representative (Notional Lunar) Lander Missions 
Short Stay Excursions   Mission/flight profile:  Transit to and land on lunar surface; mission duration on the 
order ten to sixteen days; perform short duration focused science investigations and/or high priority infrastructure 
staging activity, in the immediate area of the lander, during stay.  Critical capability: system reliability and overall 
safety. Technical challenges:  Performance versus weight trades.  Autonomous system technology challenges: 
Improved pilot/crew situational awareness (e.g. synthetic vision) during descent phase as well as improved 
overall system reliability by means of more robust fault-tolerant control systems and computers onboard the 
vehicle.  Risk/hazard: failure of critical flight systems during descent/ascent.  
Extended Stay   Mission/flight profile:  Conduct surface operations from a lander for a minimum of forty days 
for lunar missions (maybe as long as a year or more for some Mars mission scenarios); surface operations would 
include not only science investigations but infrastructure development efforts such as lunar base/encampment 
assembly/construction as well as technology demonstrations such a robotic system trials and “test driving” 
advanced spacecraft systems for future exploration efforts; surface lander must serve both a space-limited but 
robust habitat for extended occupancy as well as providing functionality for conducting remote and semi-
autonomous surface operations and science campaigns.  Critical capability: To perform surface operations (in 
terms of duration, the number of crew on the surface, and the types of tasks performed) well beyond the 
experience with Apollo. Technical challenges:  safe and robust environmental control and overall cabin 
habitability while maximizing efficiency of surface operations.  Autonomous system technology challenges:  
highly reliable fault-tolerant “networks” of critical spacecraft systems; surface operation 
teleoperation/telepresence and semi-autonomous control consoles; science stations control and analysis systems; 
“smart” furnishing to maximize utility of limited cabin space; robotic smart field assistants to offload crew for 
surface operations.  The high level of crew involvement in system maintenance/oversight typified by ISS 
experience would be unacceptable in the context of a lunar or Mars mission.  Risk/hazard:  failure of critical 
systems during extended stay excursions.   
Automated Cargo Deployment (Pallet-Version)   Mission/flight profile:  Infrastructure development efforts as 
well as extended stays enabled by lunar habitats will dictate a robust method for re-supply to the lunar and/or 
planetary surfaces.  Critical capability: maximum payload capacity and flexibility in loading and unloading and 
stowage. Technical challenges:  to maximize commonality with the crewed surface landers (and other types of 
automated cargo landers) to minimize costs while at the same time yielding maximum cargo-carrying capacity.  
Autonomous system technology challenges:  reliable spacecraft automation particularly for the landing phase of 
the descent; this will require hazard avoidance at challenging landing sites but also high degree of precision and 
flight safeguards for landing near high-value, pre-existing surface assets and personnel (such as habitats, lunar 
observatories, etc.).  Risk/hazard:  loss of vehicle and possibly surface assets upon landing. 
Automated Cargo Deployment (Combined Container/Habitat-Module-Version)   Mission/flight profile:  
Periodic transit to and deployment of habitat modules and other such facilities to enable lunar bases and 
extended-stay encampments at key sites.  Critical capability: Safely cradle high-value and likely irreplaceable 
assets to lunar/planetary surface.  To provide for a more sophisticated automated surface lander uniquely tailored 
for the conveyance and deployment (on the ground) of habitat and surface operation infrastructure assets.  
Technical challenges:  flexible/adaptable mechanical, electrical, and control interfaces to handle disparate large-
scale items of “cargo” with respect to the lander descent module.  Autonomous system technology challenges:  
automated/robotic “cargo-handling” deployment systems of the habitat to the ground.  Risk/hazard: damage to 
habitat assets during landing or deployment from cargo lander to surface site for ultimate emplacement.  
Automated Cargo Deployment (ISRU/Utilities Version)   Mission/flight profile: the transport of more 
specialized payloads than more general kinds of “cargo.”  Critical capability:  A highly specialized surface lander 
custom modified, or designed, to land one-of-a-kind, large-scale technology demonstrations (such as In-Situ 
Resource Utilization (ISRU) “refineries”) or “public utility” systems (such as a nuclear power sources, 
“greenhouses,” or bio-quarantine facilities (for returning astrobiology samples from Mars or the outer planets)). 
Technical challenges:  each specialized payload while have its own unique engineering challenges; the cargo 
lander, though, should have sufficient generality/flexibility in its interfacing with the payload that significant 
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reworking of such interfaces would not have to take place for each new payload.  Autonomous system technology 
challenges:  “plug and play” architecture concepts.  Risk/hazard: improper or poorly tested interfaces between the 
lander and the payload.  
“Double Eagle” Surface Lander Deployment   Mission/flight profile: optimized design to maximize the amount 
and distribution/deployment of cargo to the lunar surface; transit to lunar orbit two “pallet”-version automated 
lunar cargo landers via a single service module, or transit vehicle; deploy the two cargo landers to two different 
sites on the lunar surface; provides ability to pre-stage supply caches on the lunar surface prior to a major 
expeditionary campaign as a long-distance surface trek via crewed lunar rovers.  Critical capability:  Provide an 
efficient means of pre-staging expeditionary assets/resources across lunar surface. Technical challenges: 
Specialized interface hardware (and likely transit vehicle modifications) and docking maneuvers to enable the 
automated transport/transit and deployment of multiple surface landers during a single flight.  Autonomous 
system technology challenges: cargo landers have to be fully automated with high system redundancy and 
reliability; descent/landing hazard avoidance technologies are critical.  Risk/hazard: fully automated mission, 
even during the transit phase.    
Orbital Facility Build-Up    Mission/flight profile: upon conclusion of surface excursions the crewed ascent 
modules not only rendezvous with, dock, and transfer crew to CEV command modules but are reused (not 
jettisoned and expended) as a component of a nascent orbital facility; the orbital lunar (and possibly Mars) facility 
would be composed of a combination of recycled ascent modules and dedicated system components launched 
from Earth to complete the facility.  Critical capability:  recycling otherwise “expended” spacecraft assets might 
enable the construction of lunar and Mars orbital facilities that might not be feasible by any other means; such 
recycling ideas have been previously proposed with respect to shuttle external tanks and retired shuttles for 
augmenting the LEO infrastructure. Technical challenges:  uncertainty in the feasibility and magnitude of effort in 
order to perform such in-space “recycling.”  Autonomous system technology challenges:  enabling autonomous 
system flexibility to allow reprogramming for systems to radically different uses than originally intended (e.g. 
“plug and play” computer/software architectures).  Need to be designed to be reused.  Risk/hazard: in-space/on-
surface longevity of spacecraft elements, particularly the recycled ascent modules, and re-supply of spent fuel for 
attitude control; viability of transforming/modifying the interior of an ascent module (while in space) into a long-
term habitable work/living area in an orbital environment.   
 
Table 3 illustrates the interdependence and criticality of individual surface lander missions with respect to the 
larger-in-scope notional expeditionary campaigns and infrastructure development activity noted in the Fig. 5 
hierarchy of exploration activity.   Note that the (six) individual missions/mission capabilities can be qualitatively 
rated in terms of criticality (the value of zero being assigned for negligible contribution and ten for essential) to the 
corresponding notional expeditionary campaigns or infrastructure efforts.    Such assessments are the purview of 
high-level mission planners and the assignment of values provided below is for illustration purposes only.    
 
 
Table 3 – Exploration Campaigns building upon individual Missions and Capabilities: Interdependence 
and Criticality 
 
Campaigns 
Or Infrastructure 
Short Stay 
Excursions 
Extended 
Stay    
Automated 
Cargo 
Deployment 
(Pallet) 
Automated 
Cargo 
Deployment 
(Habitat) 
Automated 
Cargo 
Deployment 
(ISRU/Utilities) 
“Double 
Eagle” 
Deployment 
Human Bases & 
Encampments 
4 10 8 8 8 0 
Expeditionary Surface Treks 
 
6 8 10 0 0 9 
Test Drive (for evaluation of 
future exploration systems) 
6 8 10 6 8 0 
Lunar Observatories 
 
3 7 7 0 0 0 
In-Situ Resource 
Demonstrations 
0 7 7 7 10 0 
Robotic Outposts & Virtual 
Presence 
8 5 8 0 3 0 
Lunar/Planetary Orbital 
Facilities 
10 10 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 6a-b provides for illustration some simple “mission profiles” for a few of the Tables 2-3 notional 
expeditionary campaigns.  The necessity to sometimes combine a series of missions together to support a single 
exploration campaign can be seen from these simple examples.   
 
(a) 
(b) 
 
Fig. 6a-b.  “Mission Profiles” of Some Notional Lunar Campaigns: (a) Expeditionary Surface Treks and (b) 
Build-Up Orbital Facilities 
 
 
C. Fundamental Questions about Human-Rated Lander Autonomy 
 
The problem to be studied in this work is easy to describe but difficult to solve:  
First, what is the optimum level of vehicle autonomy and intelligence required for a particular human-rated 
surface lander mission/application, so as to assure acceptable levels of success and safety while at the same 
time keeping development and implementation costs to a minimum?   
Second, what are the specific attributes of an autonomous system implementation essential for a given surface 
lander mission/application in order to maximize mission success?   
 
Autonomy metrics are defined for this particular mission/application domain that are both quantifiable and 
practical in terms of their utility.  These metrics include level of autonomy, intelligence, and elegance.  Autonomy is 
defined for the purposes of this work as the lander onboard systems’ ability to perform certain identified tasks with 
varying levels of human intervention (whether from the crew and ).   Intelligence measures how well these tasks are 
performed under varying degrees of task and environmental complexity and other associated constraints and 
conditions.  And, elegance is the computational efficiency by which the lander onboard systems’ intelligence is 
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implemented.   Additionally, first order functional relationships are proposed that relate these autonomy metrics to 
notional human-rated lander characteristics and mission requirements.  Finally, the contribution of individual 
autonomous system technologies (of which a large set of potentially viable technologies will be identified) can be 
related to high-level programmatic goals, mission cost, risk, and return on investment criteria.   
 
This work, though preliminary in nature, will hopefully serve as a useful tool for exploration system architects in 
their efforts to assess the optimum strategy for autonomous system technology investment to support future 
spacecraft development.    
 
D. Autonomy & Perception Issues 
 
As noted in Refs. 12-13 there appears to be a “trust” issue, as well as cost/benefit perception issues (those 
perceiving something to be more costly or less beneficial than demonstrably it is), for the application of autonomous 
system technology to spacecraft – particularly human-rated systems.   It is also interesting to note the distinction of 
autonomy in the context of decision-making being made by groundside mission control or onboard the spacecraft 
(either by the crew or a set of autonomous systems).  The distinction is very much highlighted in Ref. 11, wherein 
two scales/metrics (the “level of automation” and the “level of autonomy”) are defined to capture just such 
groundside versus onboard decision-making issues.  These perception issues will need to be dealt with; however, it 
is clear that incorporation of high-levels of autonomy for crewed spacecraft is inevitable.  This position will be 
argued on the basis of posing the following line of logic (an informal version of reductio ad absurdum argument) in 
support of the aforesaid conclusion.   
 
(i) Future human spaceflight missions will be much longer in duration and further in deep-
space than past efforts.  This will pose new challenges for communications with Earth and 
for supply chain logistics for these future exploration efforts.    
 (ii) Transporting large quantities of supplies and equipment to lunar and planetary surfaces 
will require the development of specialized cargo-variants of surface landers; these cargo 
landers will be fully automated.   
(iii) Further, building surface infrastructure for long-term expeditionary campaigns (for semi-
permanent bases or large temporary encampments) will require the development of a 
specialized variant of surface lander to transport habitat modules and large infrastructure 
assemblies; this type of lander will also be fully automated.   
(iv) In both the above cases, the timely, efficient, and reliable (i.e. minimum tolerance for 
failure) transportation of cargo and infrastructure components to lunar and planetary 
surfaces is equally important to overall mission success and crew wellbeing (when 
considering the complete mission and not just the in-space phase) as the safety and 
reliability of the crewed lander operations.    
(v) Given the necessity of developing the autonomous system technology for the above highly 
autonomous lander variants, is it conceivable that mission planners will “discard” that 
autonomy capability for crewed-variants of the surface landers?  In particular, consider the 
following additional concerns:  
(a) What happens if the crew becomes incapacitated (through sickness, or 
fatigue and debilitation from prolonged in-space transit and/or 
demanding extended surface operations) in some manner and light-speed 
delays prohibit safe groundside operation of spacecraft systems?  
Fully/highly autonomous systems may be the only safety net for the crew 
under this type of circumstance.   
(b) If one restricts oneself to only considering lunar campaigns, versus Mars 
or other deeps-space mission, such that others might argue that high-
levels of autonomy are not required because the heritage of Apollo 
suggests that such a capability is not needed to be successful, then how 
does one argue that the lunar campaigns act as a 
technological/operational steppingstone for future explorations as the 
Vision for Space Exploration has annunciated?    
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(c) Finally, the long-term sustainability of exploration – and ultimately 
deriving economic benefits from such exploration – will be contingent 
upon use of advanced robotics and teleoperated systems to act as agents 
for (their work coordinated both in parallel with and in place of) human 
beings.  All things being equal, a colony of robots has to be cheaper, 
safer, and, therefore, more sustainable in the long term, than a colony of 
humans.   
(vi) The answer to the question posed above is “no.”  “No,” such highly autonomous system 
capabilities will not and cannot be restricted (“discarded”) in their application to crewed 
surface landers (and other spacecraft).   
 
 
III. System Analysis Methodology 
 
The basic “system analysis of autonomy” methodology is outlined in this section.  The problem to be studied is 
easy to describe but difficult to solve: 
• First, what is the optimum level of vehicle autonomy and intelligence required for a particular surface 
lander mission/application, so as to assure acceptable levels of success and safety while at the same time 
keeping development and implementation costs to a minimum?   
• Second, what are the specific attributes of an autonomous system implementation essential for a given 
mission/application and vehicle in order to maximize mission success?  
 
To solve this problem it is first necessary to define metrics to aid in the required system analysis.   
 
A. Concepts and Initial Metrics 
 
Considerable work has been documented in the literature as to machine intelligence metrics, particularly for 
terrestrial UAVs, e.g. Refs. 4. 7, and 9; however, only modest work has been dedicated to automation of crewed 
spacecraft, e.g. Refs. 10-11.  Delving briefly into the autonomy versus intelligence debate, autonomy is defined for 
the purposes of this paper as the ability to independently perform without human intervention actions, tasks, or roles.   
Intelligence measures how well these actions, tasks or roles are performed under varying degrees of task and 
environmental complexity and other associated constraints and conditions.  And, elegance is the computational 
efficiency by which the autonomous vehicle intelligence is implemented.   Therefore, it is wholly possible that two 
robotic systems can be at nominally equivalent autonomy levels but exhibit radically different levels of intelligence.  
For example, one robot (space- or planetary-surface-based or otherwise) could perhaps only perform its tasks in a 
simple invariant environment, whereas the other robotic system could perform those nominally same tasks in a 
highly uncertain, unknown, or changing environment.  The latter robotic system is clearly more intelligent than the 
robot that can only successfully operate in the simpler environment, though their autonomy levels may be 
equivalent.  (For example, one can operate with the availability of GPS, the other can operate without the need for 
GPS.)  The more intelligent system requires less infrastructure, and should require less overhead, in order to perform 
its tasks.   
 
The definitions of intelligence and elegance used in this paper are based upon the work in Ref. 3.  In that 
the Ref. 3 was primarily focused on solely robotic planetary missions it is necessary to make small but significant 
modifications to the definitions of intelligence and elegance to accommodate crewed (though potentially highly 
automated) spacecraft.   The result is Eqs. (1a-d), which gives the proposed (non-normalized) metrics for vehicle 
intelligence and elegance (for a given prescribed autonomy level) for the human-rated spacecraft, including the 
surface lander problem currently being studied:  
 
 
Intelligence   Mission Success Environmental & Operational Complexity
1+ Number of Intelligent Systems( )  1+ Number of Crew( )
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Or, alternatively, 
 
 = SCEO
1+ NR( ) 1+ Ncrew( )
 
 
Correspondingly,  
 
Elegance  Intelligence
Autonomous System Complexity  1+ Number of Intelligent Systems( )  1+ Number of Crew( )
 
 
 
Or  
 
 = 
CAS 1+ NR( ) 1+ Ncrew( )
 
 (1a-d) 
 
The above expressions for non-normalized intelligence and elegance can now be applied to human-rated highly-
automated spacecraft.   In large respect, these changes to accommodate crewed or potentially crewed (versus wholly 
robotic as originally conceived in Ref. 3) spacecraft are relatively minor.   Figure 7 provides a simple illustration of 
what is exactly implied by this combination of “intelligent systems,” robotic technologies, and spacecraft crew.   
 
 
 
 
Fig7.  Surface landers: a collective system of “intelligent systems,” robotic devices, and crew    
 
 
In introducing the above expressions for the spacecraft intelligence and elegance, two new terms were also 
introduced: CEO , environmental and operational complexity, and, CAS , autonomous system complexity.   Note 
that for autonomy levels 3-5, at least, which is the primary focus of the current work, the following holds true:   
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Environmental & Operational Complexity 
    System Mobility Degrees of Freedom
    Number of Control  Actuators  
     Required  Control Input Rate
    Number of Sensors
   Degree  of  Inaccessibility
   Degree  of  Resistance
   Degree  of Interaction
    Inverse  of  Opportunity Frequency 
 
 
 
Or, alternatively,  
 
CEO = NDOFNCRCNSDIDR
DIN
FT
 
 
 
And  
 
Autonomous  System  Complexity 
    Lines of Software  Code
    Number of State  Space  Variables
    Number of Robotic  Behaviors or Programmed Tasks
    Number of Conditio nal  (Heuristic) Rules
    Number of Processors
    Size of System  Dynamic  Memory
   Mean Processor(s) Instruction  or  Operation Speed
 
 
 
Or, rather,  
 
CAS = NLNvNBNRuleNPNM FP  
 
 (2a-d) 
 
 
Refer to Table 4 for some of the constituent elements that comprise the definition of the environmental and 
operational complexity, CEO , for surface landers.   The exact definition for CEO  will vary from application 
domain to application domain, though there are some common elements in general with the various autonomous 
system applications.  Eqs. 2c-d have, therefore, also been slightly recast and revised from the Ref. 3 
definitions/expressions to reflect the shift in application focus from fully autonomous planetary robotic systems 
(particularly that of planetary aerial vehicles, a.k.a “aerial explorers,” such as Mars airplanes) to crewed spacecraft 
embodying various types of autonomous systems.   
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Table 4 -- Defining Environmental and Operation Complexity  
 
Types of 
Applications or 
Systems 
Factors Affecting 
“Degree of 
Inaccessibility” 
Factors Affecting 
“Degree of 
Resistance” 
Factors Affecting 
“Degree of 
Interaction” 
Factors Affecting 
“Opportunity” 
Frequency 
Surface lander vehicle -- Terrain ruggedness at 
landing site 
-- Distance from “safe” 
landing site to field sites or 
encampments 
-- Target landing site 
coordinates might be 
difficult to achieve from an 
orbital mechanics 
perspective 
 
-- Landing and excursion 
stays at sites under extreme 
diurnal or seasonal 
conditions (e.g. lunar 
“night” and “day”) 
-- Environmental conditions 
such as wind, dust, 
electrostatic charge for 
planetary bodies with 
significant atmospheres (i.e. 
Mars)  
-- Environmental conditions 
such as dust, radiation, etc. 
-- Number of external 
science instruments and 
robotic devices directly 
operated from lander 
science station 
-- Number of surface 
operations hardware 
operated remotely from 
lander 
-- Networking with other 
pre-existing surface, 
orbital, and earth-side 
assets 
 
-- Density of surface 
features of geologic (or 
astrobiology) interest near 
landing site or 
encampment 
-- Density, accessibility, 
and utility of in-situ 
resources  
-- Availability of 
acceptable sites from an 
infrastructure perspective 
(level surface, good soil 
characteristics, etc.) 
Rovers and other 
robotic surface 
operation hardware 
-- Terrain ruggedness 
impeding access of 
wheeled/tracked platform 
-- Availability of solar 
flux, temperature 
conditions 
-- Limitations of 
communication and data 
relay 
… 
-- Surface traction (or lack 
thereof) 
-- Grade of terrain slope 
and/or elevation 
-- Amount and type of 
surface dust/soil as to 
potentially gumming up 
mechanisms or covering 
solar arrays 
… 
-- Required level of robot-
to-robot and intelligent-
system to intelligent 
coordination (from a peer 
or equal-to-equal 
perspective or a 
leader/subordinate 
relationship) required to 
perform primary tasks  
… 
-- Anticipated distribution 
of notable and accessible 
rock formations 
-- Anticipated depth of 
subsurface ice and other 
soil constituents for 
drilling 
-- Anticipated or 
hypothesized presence of 
signs of ancient water 
Planetary aerial 
vehicles, a.k.a. aerial 
explorers (Ref. 3) 
-- Terrain ruggedness 
obscuring surface features 
of interest 
-- Atmospheric density at 
altitude of interest 
Limitations in data relay 
… 
-- Atmospheric turbulence 
-- Wake/winds off of large 
geologic formations 
buffeting vehicle 
-- Icing or contamination of 
control surfaces 
… 
-- Number and persistence 
of air-deployed 
probes/devices 
-- Number of other pre-
existing spacecraft assets 
interacted with 
… 
-- Pre-mission anticipated 
survey area density of 
discrete targets of 
scientific interest 
-- Ratio of estimated 
vehicle range (squared) to 
ideal survey area 
… 
Terrestrial HALE 
UAV (Ref. 4) 
-- Amount of solar flux 
available (for solar-
powered vehicles) for a 
given time of year and 
latitude 
-- Optimal altitude (e.g. 
cruise at 60 Kft might be 
achievable technology-
wise but not 100 Kft) 
--  Cross-winds during take-
off/landing and/or transit to 
operating altitude 
-- For military applications, 
could include effectiveness 
of surface to air defenses of 
opponent 
…  
--  Total number of aerial 
assets required to perform 
the mission 
-- Number of ground 
control stations and 
operators 
-- Number of satellite 
assets for adequate data 
bandwidth 
-- In search and rescue 
applications (SAR), the 
total number of missing 
personnel 
-- E.g. SAR, again, the 
uncertainty in extent and 
location of survey area 
…  
 
 
In deriving the autonomous system complexity metric, the “collective” system complexity should be used to 
estimate CAS .  (The term “collective” being used in the sense of including all of the multiple 
automated/autonomous systems onboard, or integrated with, the surface lander – including all those systems noted in 
Fig. 7 -- excluding the crewmembers.)  In this regard a surface lander can be thought of as collective on 
interdependent automated/autonomous systems both internal and external to the lander itself; such a whole 
collective whole of systems contribute to the success – and risk and cost – of the complete mission and not just the 
in-flight descent and ascent operation of the spacecraft.    
 
As noted in the above definitions of intelligence and elegance, mission success is an intrinsic parameter to those 
definitions.  In addition to mission success, from a systems analysis perspective, it also important to assess mission 
return on investment.   Mission return on investment (MROI) – versus ROI in the macroeconomic-sense – can be 
expressed as  
 
CostRisk
SuccessMission 

=MROI  
 (3) 
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Table 5 notes a number of different measures/metrics for estimating/tracking mission success that can be 
defined.   Each type of mission has its own unique mission success metric (though there are certain common 
constituent elements).   Assessing overall mission success needs to be established through a combination of 
flight test and mission simulation.   This will be discussed subsequently in the context of autonomous system 
technology validation.   Some of the notional vehicle systems associated with the Table 5 missions are shown in 
Fig. 8.   
 
Table 5 -- Mission Success Metrics for Various Notional Missions/Campaigns 
 
Mission Mission Success Metric 
  
Crewed Surface Lander  
--Short Stay Excursions 
-- Extended Stay 
SNcrewTv  
Automated Cargo Deployment 
-- Pallet, Habitat, etc.  
SmcTv  
Science “Investigations” 
 -- As a part of short and extended 
stay excursions & occupancy of 
surface bases or orbital facilities 
S Information Gathered =  
     Number of sensors    Measure of spatiotemporal dispersal of sensors
     Mean sophistication of sensors   Number of different types of sensors
      Ability to interprete or adapt given past results   Ability to verify results
      Ability to cross correlate independent measurements
 
Note:    pallet < container/
habitat
< isru demo                                             container/
habitat
< pallet <double
eagle
 
  mp  aNcrew +mc                                                                        a  100      
 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
Fig. 8.  (a) “Double Eagle” Cargo Pallet Delivery in Support of Expeditionary Trek, (b) “Habitat” Cargo 
Variant, and (c) Orbital Facility 
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Note that there are no upper bounds on the above definitions of the mission success, intelligence and elegance 
metrics.  Their maximum values are dependent upon a given set of vehicle, environmental, and mission 
characteristics -- which, in turn, are subject to refinement as vehicle designs are matured, mission concept of 
operations (CONOPS) are detailed, and system characteristics are predicted with improved fidelity 
analysis/simulation tools and/or measured in flight.  Though these autonomy metrics can and should be defined by 
using the above detailed formulae, a simpler approach should be used when system analysis of vehicle/mission 
concepts is to be performed.  Therefore “normalized versions of system intelligence and elegance,  *  and * , must 
be defined where the normalized values fall within the ranges 0  * 10 and 0  * 10 .  That is, it is posited that 
there are some notional normalization factors such that  *  Constant Factor  and *   Constant Factor  wherein the 
above range of values holds true for all realizable exploration surface lander missions.  In practice, neither 
quantitative estimates of  and , or definition of actual values of Constant Factor  and Constant Factor  need be made in 
order to gain some advantage from the concept of using normalized measures for these key parameters.  The 
proposed “normalization” is a pragmatic technique that allows engineering judgment to be used in the early stages of 
the system analysis process, in place of making detailed but difficult estimates of vehicle intelligence and elegance 
using Eqs. 1-4.  It is anticipated that the intelligence and elegance metrics will occasionally need to be re-normalized 
with improved mission simulation and autonomous system development results.  Correspondingly, the degrees of 
inaccessibility, DI, degrees of resistance, DR. and degrees of interaction, DIN, can also be “normalized” to range 
between the values of 0 to 10 and engineering judgment used in place of detailed analysis and mission simulation to 
define these parameters.    
 
 
B. Assessing First-Order Cost and Risk 
 
In the most global sense, mission success, risk, and costs are functions of not only the vehicle LOA, but also the 
vehicle’s intelligence, , and elegance, , at a given LOA.   Mission success, as noted earlier, can only be assessed in 
terms of flight test and simulation.  On the other hand, first-order parametric expressions can be posited for the 
functionality of risk and cost with respect to a vehicle’s intelligence and the elegance of its autonomous system 
implementation.  Specifically, for the purposes of this exercise, it is conjectured that the functional forms for the risk 
and cost metrics are, respectively, as follows:   
 
 
  
Risk  x T ,Ncrew ,MTBF,K( ) f *,*
 
  
 
 	 
 
 
 
  
Cost  y T ,Ncew ,MTBF,K( )g *,*
 
 	 
 
 
 h ( )
 
 (4 a-b) 
 
Where the dependence of vehicle/mission risk and cost on total system level of autonomy, intelligence, and elegance 
is given by the general functions: h ( ) , f *,*   
 
  , and g 
*,*   
 
  .   The “non-autonomy-related vehicle, payload, or 
service interruption risks are encapsulated in the functions 
  
x T ,Ncrew ,MTBF,K( )  and   y T ,Ncew ,MTBF,K( ) .  
These functions must be semi-empirically derived from heritage spacecraft data and projected risk and cost 
estimates.  The derivation of these functions is beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
Possible functions for a simple model of the dependence of vehicle/mission cost and risk on total system level 
of autonomy, intelligence, and elegance is given by the expressions  
 
 
f *,*  	 
 
 
 
a2 *
 
 	 
 
 
 
n2
a1 + *
 
 	 
 
 
 
n1
+ a3 *
 
 	 
 
 
 
n3  
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g *,*  	 
 
 
  c1 
* 
 	 
 
 
 
m1 *  	 
 
 
 
m2  
 
 
h ( )  1+( )m0  
 (4c-e) 
 
 
In effect, Eq. 4a-e can be considered a generalization of the early work presented for aerial explorers and planetary 
robotic systems, Ref. 3, and high-altitude long endurance UAVs, Ref. 4.   
 
 
C. Relationship between Mission Requirements and Autonomy Requirements 
 
Drawing upon the Table 2 mission descriptions and the Table 5 mission success metrics, Table 6 summarizes an 
assessment, using engineering judgment at this point of the analysis, as to key operational/environmental parameters 
that will be used shortly to postulate functional relationships between these parameters and metrics for surface 
lander intelligence and elegance.   Further refinement of the Table 6 data as regards the interdependence of mission 
versus autonomy requirements can be established through appropriate polling of subject matter experts (SME’s).   
Subsequently, as the system designs mature, design data and test and evaluation results to help further refine the 
autonomy requirements.  However, for initial system analysis trend studies the Table 6 results should provide 
valuable insight into the relative necessity for autonomous system technologies.  DI
*, DR
* , and DIN
*  denote 
respectively the normalized degrees of inaccessibility, resistance, and interaction.   
 
 
Table 6 -- Functional Relationship Assessment 
 
Notional Lander Missions or 
Campaigns 
Number of 
Crew 
Members 
Mission 
Duration, T 
(Days) 
DI
*
 
(1-10) 
DR
*
 
(1-10) 
DIN
*
 
(1-10) 
 
 (1-10) 
*  
(1-10) 
Short Stay Excursions    4 10 1 1 1 1 3 
Extended Stay    4 40 3 3 3 5 6 
Automated Cargo Deployment 
(Pallet)    
0 3 1 1 1 2 3 
Automated Cargo Deployment 
(Habitat)   
0 3 1 5 1 2 4 
“Double Eagle” Lander 
Deployment    
0 3 1 1 1 2 3 
Automated Cargo Deployment 
(ISRU/Utility)    
0 3 1 3 3 2 5 
Orbital Facility Build-Up     4 60 2 1 3 2 6 
Great Treks 4 >40 5 5 5 2 7 
Test Drive (evaluation of future 
exploration systems) 
4 40 8 8 10 9 9 
Lunar Observatories 4 >1095 5 5 7 4 7 
In-Situ Resource Demonstrations 0 >120 5 7 7 4 8 
Robotic Outposts & Virtual 
Presence 
0 >1095 5 6 10 7 8 
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As can be expected, the Table 6 values are only approximate descriptions of a broad range of possible mission 
types.  Resulting functional relationships have been derived on the basis of functional analysis using the Table 6 
“data” – which in turn was derived using engineering judgment.   Note that an additional parametric influence for 
total mission  v , “Delta-V,” and the influence of crew size, Ncrew , is included in the normalized intelligence 
expression.  Including the total mission v  provides a means of accounting for the increasing complexity and 
arguably the increasing importance of system reliability (including that of the autonomous system technologies) of 
deep space planetary (versus lunar) missions.  The crew size also influences the required intelligence of the 
spacecraft.   With increasing crew size more tasks could theoretically be performed manually, if necessary.   On the 
other hand, more crewmembers likely dictate greater sophistication in environmental controls and crew amenities 
(including, of course, the intrinsic autonomous system technologies built into such systems).  Refer to the following:   
 
 
* = f Ncrew ,T ,v,DI ,DR ,DIN ,( )  
 (5) 
 
 
Figure 9 qualitatively illustrates (in a “development arc” type chart) the nominal functionality of the normalized 
intelligence metric with respect to one of the key mission parameters identified in Table 6 and Eq. 5, i.e. T , mission 
duration.   
 
 
 
Fig. 9.   “Development Arc” Chart for Mission Capabilities (i.e. Mission Duration) as a Function of Achieving 
a Target Normalized Intelligence Metric 
 
 
It is postulated that the relative parametric influence of the mission parameters on spacecraft intelligence can be 
given nominally by the relative contribution breakout seen in Fig. 10.    
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Fig. 10. Postulated Relative Mission Parameter Contributions to Normalized Intelligence Metric 
 
 
 
Going one step further, it is conjectured that the functionality of Eq. 5 can be expressed by the simple model  
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 (6) 
 
 
Where the following constant values are suggested (so at to arrive at a nominal, though not exact, agreement with 
the Table 6 data, i.e. a non-rigorous “curve-fitting” of the trend data being attempted): a0 = 0.8, a1 = 0.2, a2 = 0.15, a3 
= 0.15, a4 = 3.0, a5 = 0.8, and a6 = 1.5; m0 = 0.5, m1 = 0.5, m2 = 1, and m3 = 10.  Figure 11a-g illustrates the 
incremental contribution of each parameter to the normalized intelligence metric.   
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Figure 11a-g.   Incremental Vehicle Normalized Intelligence Contribution from Key Mission Parameters: (a) 
LOA, (b) DI, (c) DR, (d) DIN, (e) total mission “Delta-V,” (f) mission duration, and (g) crew size 
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D. Individual Autonomous System Technologies & Achieving Autonomy Metrics & Goals 
 
Relating the development progress and contribution of individual technologies, represented by the j
th 
array 
element *
jB , to the overall intelligence metric for autonomous vehicles is performed as follows 
 
B j
*
=
W j
*B j +W0
*I j
*S
W j
*
+W0
*
 for j1 
 (7) 
 
Where S is a normalized (S1) “mission success” metric derived from mission simulations incorporating the 
individual autonomous system technologies in specified set of vehicle/mission scenarios.  Note that W0
*  and *
jW  
comprise a set of weighting factor metric for relative weighting given to the two types of technology assessments 
embodied in Eq. 7. The weight W0
*  is given to the “objective” simulation-derived mission success technology 
assessment.  The weight *
jW  is given to the technologist’s “self-assessment” of the normalized technology 
readiness level (TRL) of the jth autonomous system technology implemented in the mission simulation, 
jB , or as 
otherwise denoted by 
 













...
"9"by  divided Technologyjth   theof TRL
...
 "9"by  divided Technology1st   theof TRL
B
 
 (8) 
 
Note by definition that W0
*
+W j
*
= 2  must hold true for all technologies, i.e. all values of j.  The weights *jW  are 
specified as follows, relying on the matrix Q, which in turn is derived from the QFD-inspired tabular matrix shown 
in Fig. 12.   
 
 W j
*
= aI j
*  and I j
*
= u 10
W j
WF
+  *  9
 
 
 
 
 
  (9a-b) 
 
Where 
 
 ( )Wmax=FW  and W j = Q i, j
i
  (9c-d) 
 
The constant a, Eq. 9a, is arbitrarily assigned to reflect the relative weight of 
*
jW  with respect to W0
* ; a=1.0 is 
suggested.  The array W can be thought of as denoting the relative importance of each individual technology, based 
upon the Q matrix input, as to contributing the overall goals of the project.  This will be discussed further in the 
analysis and results section.  Note that during the course of flight tests and/or mission simulations (embodying the 
autonomous system implementation), if an individual technology is not implemented then the “TRL” value of that 
technology is set to zero (irrespective of its previously demonstrated, but not implemented in the current simulation 
or flight test).   
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Autonomous System Technologies
1 … … … O
Q Matrix of Weights
Objectives:
1
…
…
N
Goals:
1
…
…
M
 
Figure 12.  General format of QFD-Inspired Tabular Matrix 
 
 
IV. Technology Portfolio 
 
Finally, the progress towards developing individual autonomous system technologies needs to be tracked 
against progress towards overall programmatic goals/objectives (in so far as affected by those same autonomous 
system technologies, and not other “extraneous” vehicle technologies).   This is accomplished in the proposed 
analysis by the following relationship for “fractional anticipated contribution to goal” array, 
*
iC .    
 
=
j
jiii ,
*
QCC  
 (10) 
Where 
  
*
QBC =  
 (11) 
 
Note that by definition, for a given i'th row of the matrix Q, the following holds true  
 
 
 
j
ji 1,Q
 (12) 
 
Note that the initial weighting factors, Qi,j, used in the Fig. 12 QFD-inspired matrix can be determined as per Eq. 
13. This initial weighting factor scheme can either assume that all contributing autonomous system technologies 
uniformly/equally contribute to the i'th Goal or. Alternatively, the weighs can be nominally partitioned between 
enabling (A=1) and contributing technologies (A=0.25).   
 
 
Goalith   toogy,th technolj' including es,Technologi System Autonomous ngContributi ofNumber 
,
A
ji =Q
 
 
 (13) 
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Subsequent iterations on the Fig. 12 weighting factors can be adjusted to reflect sensitivity analysis results 
and/or mission simulations that show that autonomous system technologies do not uniformly contribute to the goals.    
Additionally, the weighting factors can also reflect resource/funding issues that may not fully stem from engineering 
considerations alone (i.e. not all promising technologies may be funded at the required levels, or funded at all, to 
achieve the anticipated contributions to the technology goals).   
 
Figure 13 reveals a little more closely some of the interchangeability of information between the QFD-like Q-
matrix and the GOTChA process.  Aspects of this limited interchangeability of information has great utility – first, 
in terms of visualization/presentation of Q-matrix results in the, perhaps more familiar, GOTChA format and, 
second, the GOTChA process can be used as an efficient means of data entry for the Q-matrix.  In fact this was the 
process by which the initial Q-matrix was populated in the Ref. 4 work.   
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Information Exchange between the Q-matrix and the GOTChA Methodologies (highlighted by color 
coding) 
 
 
It is appropriate to examine these notional vehicle/mission autonomous system capabilities in the context of a 
matrix inspired by Quality Function Deployment (QFD) “house of quality” matrix representation (see Ref. 14) – 
refer to Fig. 14.  The contents of this matrix naturally flow from goals, objectives, technical challenges, and 
approaches as derived by the well-known “GOTChA” process, refer, for example, to Ref. 15.  Note that the matrix 
columns represent the definition of a detailed technology capability set -- as affected (and only affected) by 
autonomous system technology.   
 
 
